Historically, the supposed independence of unions from parties in France has been a myth, with the development of close relations between the CGT and the PCF on the one hand, and looser ones between the CFDT in particular, and the PS on the other. These links weakened from the 1980s on, but appeared to be re-established, with some changes, when unions backed François Hollande in the 2012 presidential elections. The decline of the PCF and the rallying of unions behind Hollande appeared to signal the possibility of a social democratic bloc in France.
Introduction
Historically, particularly in Western Europe, left-wing parties were seen to have close links with trade unions in a mutually beneficial exchange wherein unions mobilized voters for parties and received access to power, or at least influence over policy, in return. Despite variation in the degree and pace of change across countries, some recent studies suggest a weakening of links over the past two decades (Thomas, 2001; Upchurch et al, 2009; Hyman and GumbrellMcCormick, 2010; Allern and Bale, 2012) .
3
With the notable exception of Daley (1993) very little has been written in the last few decades specifically on party-union links in France, but now is a good time to reassess the situation as France appears to be bucking wider trends. Indeed, the 2012 presidential election suggested movement towards closer party-union links after decades of professed neutrality on the part of unions. Francois Hollande's campaign team recruited members of the CFDT, while the campaign itself was influenced by CFDT notions of social democracy. After the election, In what follows, we will argue that although some of the structural conditions for close party-union relations have improved, they work in contradictory directions. The result is that cost-benefit analysis still mitigates against close links, while ideational norms are still powerful obstacles that mean that party-union relations will be characterized by ad hoc arrangements for the foreseeable future. For these reasons, Hollande's rapprochement with the unions cannot last. Firstly, we will review the literature on party-union relations with the specific aim of setting out what these structural conditions are before giving a brief overview of changes in union-party relations in France in the post-war period. We will then examine whether the 2012 elections represent a sea-change in these relations. Elements of continuity and change will then be explained before concluding comments are made.
Before this, however, a brief methodological note is in order. This article is based upon research carried out within the framework of an international project examining party-union relations in thirteen countries across the world. The results reported here are based upon an examination of secondary literature, press reports, party and union documentation, and on questionnaires sent to high-level union representatives in France. The detailed results of the questionnaires are reported elsewhere (see Allern and Bale, forthcoming) 1 . While an attempt is made to cover all union organizations, for reasons of space, the main focus will be upon the CGT and CFDT as the largest unions with, historically the closest links to left parties
Party-union links
Party-union links can take many forms and have been operationalized in many ways (see for example Duverger and Wagoner, 1968; Wilson, 1990; Thomas, 2001; Allern and Bale, 2012) .
For the purposes of this article, due to limitations of space, we will not enter into this debate but adopt a broad definition of such linkages as encompassing, through the notion of 'political families' -here defined as the sharing of broad ideological views and values across organisations -, a degree of organizational closeness that can be mapped through political support of unions for parties and reciprocation in the form of policy enactments by parties that are negotiated with, and are in line with, union preferences.
Several trends apparent since the 1970s have been used to explain the weakening of union-party relationships across these dimensions. Firstly, the catch-all party thesis (Kirchheimer, 1966) suggests that as parties attempt to appeal to a greater cross-section of society to gain power, they weaken their links with the social movements that had sustained them in the past for fear of alienating other social groups. This evolution can be seen as linked to the idea that deep class and other -particularly religious -cleavages in society resulted in close union-party links as a means of gaining influence and power (Rokkan, 1968) . The attenuation of such cleavages and 'ideological blurring' (Pasture, 1996: 380) suggest that this leads to a weakening of party-union links. The cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair, 2009) suggests that as parties are increasingly incorporated into the State, including by public financing of their activities, they lose room for manoeuvre in policy terms as they become increasingly dependent on the State rather than individuals or interest groups for funding. Such external constraints are reinforced by globalization, Europeanization, and latterly, by economic crisis all of which reduce margins for manoeuvre in the search for international competitiveness (Parsons, 2012) . The resultant policy implications mean that links with parties become less attractive to unions.
From the trade union side, the decline of the blue-collar working class, the tertiarization of the economy and the rise of the middle class have led to both ideological shifts away from social democracy and to a loss of members among unions. Again, these trends are seen as weakening party-union links, not only because unions can offer parties less, but also because unions attempt to recruit new members with different identities and interests from those of their traditional base (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010: 321) .
As well as these more recent trends, the political system has been seen as affecting party union relations. As far as France is concerned, these can be briefly summarized as follows. The predominance of a technocratic approach to decision-making overseen by a strong, self-assured bureaucracy produced in the system of elite grandes écoles was reinforced by the semipresidential system put in place after 1962. The presence of a strong executive, supported by cohesive parties in a weak parliament, resulted in a relative isolation of ministers from interest group activities. This feeds off of a deep-rooted Jacobin political culture that sees the State as the guardian of the general will (Parsons, 2013) . Consultation with unions and hence, strong party-union links, were thus never considered important by governing elites. This is all the more so as organizational fragmentation and competition, particularly amongst unions, precluded any close and long-lasting relationships (Howell, 1992: 48) .
Within the above constraints, party-union links have often been conceptualized in terms of a cost-benefit exchange (see, for example, Allern et al, 2007) . Thus, for parties, close links with unions give access to electoral support as members may be mobilized to vote for the party, as well as to, in some cases, provide financial support and help during election campaigns. For unions, the benefits may involve increased membership if the party encourages this, and, particularly, influence over the party's policies. On the cost side, parties need to take into account the possibility of alienating other groups of voters or possible coalition partners if it is seen as the union's party, and the potential for making policy promises that may conflict with other priorities. For unions, the main risk lies in alienating current and potential members, and in the loss of the freedom to seek arrangements with other parties who may offer a better deal.
Changes in cost-benefit calculations will therefore affect party-union relations.
Finally, in the French case, one other consideration appears crucial. Taylor et al (2011) argue that national patterns of party-union relations are path dependent and influenced by ideology and framing. Thus, normative factors may temper rational cost-benefit analysis and are rooted in historical legacies. We therefore now turn to a brief historical overview of partyunion relations in France. Union weakness can be seen in the fact that less than 8% of wage earners are unionized in
Parties and unions in
France-the lowest of any OECD country -, as compared to 30% in 1949 and 20% in the mid1970s (Parsons, 2013: 190-91) . French unions have lost two-thirds of their members since the 1970s (Andolfatto, 2007: 233) .
Party-union relations: the myth of independence
Party-union relations (or lack of them), however, are not merely the result of historical divisions within the industrial arm of the French labour movement, but can also be ascribed to a divided political Left at the time of the formation of French unions. While not precluding a close relationship between union and party on the communist left in the post-war period, these historical considerations have left a marked legacy on party-union relations in France.
At its creation in 1895, the CGT was marked by anarcho-syndicalist ideas and, in a context of political fragmentation on the left, opted for independence from political parties. (Charles et al, 1995: 44-8; Robert, 1995) .
After World War Two, the main cleavage on the left in France was between the communists with tight links between the CGT and PCF on the one hand, and the nocommunist left with FO, then the CFDT, forming (less tight) bonds with the Socialist Party. On the communist side of the divide, during the period from the end of World War Two to the mid-1990s, although there were no formal links between the two organizations, it was customary for the General Secretary of the CGT to be a member of the Political Bureau of the PCF. Indeed, 'the party used its leadership positions within the union to make labour market actions complement programmatic positions' (Daley, 1993: 57) . In general terms, although the CGT gained some 'relative autonomy' from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, the CGT acted as a 'transmission belt' for the PCF within a wider 'communist ecosystem' comprising clubs, societies, pressure groups and municipalities as well as the union and party (Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 17-18; Pernot, 2013: 198-9, 204-5) . However, CGT support for the PCF was not always 'muted' criticism of austerity policies while attempting to distance itself from them.
Once the PCF withdrew from government in 1984, however, the CGT 'was only too happy to return to an adversarial stance' (Howell, 1992: 164) .
Among the non-communist trade unions, relations were looser being 'more characterized by personal affinities than by organizational linkages' (Daley, 1993: 57) .
Thus, although FO was a heterogeneous grouping held together by anti-communism and therefore espoused a minimalist ideology of incremental gains through collective bargaining, it had good relations with the SFIO and then its successor, the PS. In the Following the latter's victory, high-ranking CFDT (and CGT) members were recruited as advisors in ministerial cabinets, although this was in a personal rather than organizational capacity (Kergoat, 1984; Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 140-1) . By the 1980s, CFDT influence on PS policy could be clearly seen in the field of industrial relations, with the passing of the Auroux Laws in 1982 (Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 140-1) . Even austerity policies from 1982 onwards received broad, if not at times unqualified, CFDT support (Howell, 1992: 161-4; Pernot, 2013: 213) .
The weakening of Party-Union links from the 1980s
Relations between the CGT and PCF were becoming problematic from the late 1970s
onwards. In 1977, the CGT criticised the attitude of the PCF when renegotiation of the Common Programme of Government with the PS failed and ended in acrimony, resulting in the Left's failure to win the 1978 parliamentary elections when it had seemed on the verge of power for the first time since the creation of the Fifth Republic.
The CGT Congress that year saw Georges Séguy criticise his own communistdominated leadership as it did not 'always correctly reflect the diversity of the CGT'
and for its 'intolerance towards different ideas' (cited in Andolfatto and Sabot, 2004: 34) . His call for greater diversity and openness, however, was rejected by other leaders and the organization returned to its orthodox communist beliefs under Henri Krasucki in 1982. As PCF electoral fortunes and CGT membership both declined throughout the 1980s, however, critical voices from with the CGT demanded 'modernization', and with it, greater autonomy from the PCF. The result was that whereas previous post war In 2014, the CGT, FO, USS and FSU all walked out of the conference, criticising the government for a lack of true dialogue, and for the general orientation of its policies. Only the CFDT, UNSA and CFTC, again with the CGC-CFE, remained willing to remain in discussion with the socialist government (Roussel, 2014) .
Thus, the trade union movement appears to be divided between what could loosely be termed a social democratic bloc and 'contestataires' holding to a more radical line. As noted above, the other major change in party-union relations -the gradual dissolution of the PCF-CGT dyad -appeared to be confirmed in the 2012 presidential elections as the CGT backed
Hollande rather than the PCF backed Front de gauche candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
Explanations for these evolutions and to what extent they represent a durable new configuration of party-union relations in France will now be discussed.
Evaluating change
The closest and most stable union-party relationship in France developed after World
War Two between the CGT and PCF. On the non-communist left, close relationships also developed between the PS on the one hand and FO and the CFDT on the other. In both cases, however, although 'political families' may still be discernible, the links between unions hand parties have become weaker since the 1980s, as can be seen from voting behaviour.
While data on the voting behaviour of trade union members is not available, opinion polls regularly measure voting behaviour according to trade union 'sympathy'
or 'proximity', and this can be used as a proxy for the extent to which unions can deliver votes to parties and, conversely, the extent to which parties can deliver members to unions. : 2002 : , 2007 2012 clesdusocial.com Until the 1980s, it was possible to speak of loose ties based on ideological affinity (Daley, 1993) As we have seen, the CFDT has been close to the PS since the 1970s. In the 1993 legislative elections, just over 40% of those professing to be close to the CFDT voted PS, with 45% giving their support to Lionel Jospin, the PS candidate in the 1995 presidential elections (Andolfatto, 2001: 75-77) . Support, however, has fluctuated in the twenty-first century, falling to 26% in the 2002 presidential elections before rising again to 56% in 2012 (Table 1) . Although the PS gets the lion's share of the votes from CFDT sympathisers, the vote is split. One in five CFDT sympathisers regularly votes for the Gaullist candidate in presidential and legislative elections, a figure that rose to one in three in 1997 (Andolfatto, 2001: 76) , and to 44% in the 2007 presidential elections. Even in 2012, when CFDT supporters returned to the socialist fold, 15% still voted for the Gaullist candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, and 12% for the National Front's Marine Le Pen (Table 1) .
Sources
FO, traditionally close to the left of the PS, shows a similar trajectory: a move away from support for extreme left parties and increasing support for the socialists. The latter trend is not as pronounced as for the CFDT or CGT, and the voting behaviour of FO supporters is the most diverse of any of the unions considered here. Indeed, while the PS again gets the highest share of the votes at 28%, the centre, Gaullists and the FN also score well, with the latter getting one in four votes from FO sympathisers in 2012 (Table 1) Nevertheless, CFDT, UNSA and FSU sympathisers tend to support the PS. However, while the PS is the main electoral beneficiary of trade unionists' votes, this support is volatile and fragmented with only sympathisers of the FSU voting in their majority for the PS candidate in more than one of the three presidential elections of the twenty-first century (Table 1) .
From the party side, trade union weakness and fragmentation in France has long weakened the attractiveness of stable party-union relations. Indeed, the traditional independence of unions and their appeal to workers irrespective of their partisan allegiance means that they cannot deliver voters en bloc to any one party at election time, a problem that has continued into this century. Thus, in terms of cost-benefit exchange, with the exception of the FSU, unions cannot consistently deliver voters to the PS. Once in power, the PS has little to lose, therefore, in alienating some of its trade union constituency by pursuing policies it perceives as necessary and achievable within the wider constraints imposed by global financial markets and economic crisis.
The fact that union sympathisers have coalesced behind the PS in recent elections should not therefore be seen as a sign of closer ties or union influence, but of the fact that since the late 1970s, the PS has emerged as the only credible left party of government. Put simply, if they wish to have any influence on government policy, unions, their members and sympathisers have nowhere else to go. However, if a left party captures power, it lacks a credible and dependable union interlocutor due to the political heterogeneity of the union base. While close relations are at times possible, these tend to be unstable as the experience of the 1981-84 socialist government's relations with the CFDT show.
For parties in government, this is not a major problem. Historically, the State has been seen, and has portrayed itself, as the guarantor of the general interest. As we have argued elsewhere (Parsons, 2002) , there are deep historical roots to this, producing a powerful discourse about the role of the state in France that has resulted in a certain suspicion of organized interests, and a consequent centralization of decision-making power. Under the Fifth Republic, established in 1958, de Gaulle rejected any claims of interest groups to determine policy, claiming that even the most representative lacked authority and political responsibility, as opposed to the state which, alone, could incarnate and serve the national interest. On the other hand, he accepted that they should be consulted over policy. However, the general picture was one of highly centralized, state-dominated policy-making (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 321; Hazareesingh 1994, 151 -152) . From the 1980s, the Jacobin state may have come under pressure, externally from globalization and Europeanization and internally from state policies of decentralization, deregulation and privatization, but unions have not been able to capitalize on this as these same developments have weakened them (Parsons, 2005; .
From the union side, the political heterogeneity of membership means that they have little incentive to continue to support a government that can not, or will not, deliver their preferred policies. This is all the more the case as such rational calculations must be made within the constraints of an ideational heritage that looks unfavourably upon close union-party links. To this could be added the effects of crisis management by these right-wing governments, with announcements of spending cuts and rising taxes to deal with government debt in a context of high and rising unemployment. In this respect, the CFDT's stance could be explained, not by a desire to renew and reinforce ties with PS, but by the restricted space for collective bargaining on issues such as pension reform under the previous administration (Pernot, 2013: 213-4) . For other unions too, any attempt to gain political influence could only mean support for the PS since the other major party of the Left, the PCF, had gone into sharp decline. As Didier Le Reste, the General Secretary of the CGT Railway Federation, put it, 'I think that we went too far towards a position of independence and political neutrality. That led to a certain depoliticization, which contributed to weakening the balance of power' (Deslandes, 2011) . Unions therefore want to see the left returned to power in the hope of gaining support for trade union campaigns and struggles.
However, with the exception of Thibault, union leaders hesitated to come out in favour of any particular party. In the case of the CGT this can be explained by its desire to clearly demarcate itself from the CGT and to appeal to a wider social base.
For other unions, in the context of multi-party electoral competition engendered by the French two-ballot system, it is better to say who you are against rather than to specify who you are for. This is not only because unions' membership bases have become more politically heterogeneous, so a declaration in favour of any particular candidate or party runs the risk of alienating significant proportions of the current and potential members.
It is also a function of the ideational heritage of the early trade union movement in France.
Indeed, any transgression of the demarcation between what is considered union activity and the role of parties comes up against a strong element of French political culture. As has been demonstrated above, trade union independence from political parties was a myth, but it was, and still is, a powerful one. Opinion polls regularly show that, while French unions have a generally positive image among French workers, the main criticism of them is that they are too politicized (Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 129 -131; Parsons, 2013) . In 2013, a TNS-Sofres poll found that the level of confidence in unions among wage-earners to defend their interests had remained stable since 2010 at 55%. However, there was also a degree of stability in the proportion criticising unions for being 'too ideological' (76% in 2013) and 'too politicized' (69% in 2013) (TNSSofres 2013). In Labbé and Croisat's 1992 study of the CFDT, even those sympathetic to or members of a political party, rejected party-union links. Indeed, in the study this was a motivating factor for 40% of those who had left the CFDT (Labbé and Croisat, 1992: 129 -152) . Maintaining, in public, at least, a distance from political parties therefore serves union interests in a situation where membership is already extremely low, inter-union rivalry fierce and the free rider problem acute due to the nature of the French industrial relations system. In effect, extension procedures for collective agreements and the applicability of union gains to non-members reduce individual incentives to join (Parsons, 2005) . The attempt to recruit across as broad a base as possible, therefore, gives an incentive to relations with parties being kept on a largely informal and ad hoc basis.
It can be seen that party-union links in France have been historically shaped by the notion of union independence enshrined in the 1906 Charter of Amiens. While complete union independence may have been a historical myth, the lack of organic links means that unions do not donate to parties, either to sponsor election campaigns or MPs, or via a collective affiliation of members, again weakening incentives for close relations on a cost-benefit calculation.
Conclusion
Change and continuity in party-union relationships in France can be analysed from a cost-benefit perspective. Unions see few benefits from party affiliation and closeness for several reasons: the multi-party nature of the system and the political heterogeneity of their own current and potential memberships; the inability of the only credible broadly left-wing party to deliver policies in line with their own preferences due to the constraints of electoral competition, crisis, Europeanization and globalization which limit the party's margin for manoeuvre when in government. Likewise, for parties there is little incentive for highly institutionalized relationships with fragmented, weak unions which cannot consistently deliver voters en masse, particularly as, when in power, they are relatively easily bypassed when it comes to policy delivery. The essence of these structural considerations has not changed in over one hundred years.
The main change in party-union relations in France since the 1980s has been the weakening of the link between the CGT and PCF so that one can no longer see the union as the 'transmission belt' of the party. The principle explanation for this lies in the decline of the PCF, which has seen the erosion of both its ideological and sociological bases. For its own survival in a situation of generalized trade union decline and inter-union rivalry, the CGT has had to try to diversify its membership base by appealing to workers more broadly. The CGT's move away from its former communist base has opened up the possibility of a social-democratic bloc in France based around the PS and a constellation of unions.
Beyond the communist left, much of the continuity in party-union relations can be explained structurally by inter-union rivalry and weakness and party competition, and contemporaneously by the experience of the left in government. However, they are also historically and conditioned by powerful normative discourses that see a separation between unions and parties as desirable. These discourses emanate not only from unions through their continued adherence, at least in public, to the principles of the Charter of Amiens, but also through political parties and State institutions through the notion of governing in the general interest. Thus, while the emergence of the PS as the only left alternative for government may improve the structural conditions for a reinforcement of ties on the party side of the equation, continued union fragmentation and rivalry, along with public antipathy to 'politicized' unions, mean that this is unlikely to happen, with party-union relations remaining structured around ever looser and unstable notions of 'political families'.
While the above may explain the fragility of union support for Hollande in general, it does not explain why the CFDT continues to support the government, or at least has not gone to a position of outright opposition as other unions have, in the face of austerity policies. Structural variables and a cost-benefit calculation cannot in themselves explain this position. Indeed, the risk for the CFDT is to be seen as the government's union and to alienate members and potential members as austerity continues to bite. An explanation must therefore be sought in the ideational realm as well as in cost-benefit analysis. Effectively the CFDT is sticking to a path traced since the mid-1970s when it embarked upon the process of recentrage and resyndicalisation.
Its strategy of delivering concrete gains through collective bargaining has seen the confederation grow since the 1980s. The calculation is that signing deals such as the Responsibility Pact will continue to yield concrete results and reinforce the confederation's image of 'responsible' unionism, thereby attracting new members.
This invites two observations. Firstly, the CFDT's position is not so much one of being closely tied to the PS, but one of negotiation with the State as policy-maker and with employers as bargaining partners. Second, as the structural and ideational incentives for links with parties are not strong, but with a need for dialogue with government for policy influence, support for the Hollande administration can be expected to weaken over time, with a return to neutrality in the 2017 elections a distinct possibility. Thus, the rallying of unions, even in the case of the CFDT, to Hollande for the 2012 presidential elections does not represent a sea-change in party-union relations in France. Rather the rapprochement of unions to the PS is politically contingent, and
